Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 4

Article 7

2022

The Intersection Between Animal-Protection Efforts and the Free
Exercise Clause
Ginger Pinkerton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ginger Pinkerton, The Intersection Between Animal-Protection Efforts and the Free Exercise Clause, 72
Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 1057 (2022)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol72/iss4/7

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022

— Comment —

The Intersection Between
Animal-Protection Efforts and
the Free Exercise Clause
“There is something so very dreadful, so Satanic, in tormenting
those who have never harmed us, who cannot defend themselves,
who are utterly in our power.”1
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Introduction
Deep in the largely untouched Siberian wilderness, a wild sable
bounds through the snow under cover of cedar and fir trees. The small
creature, barely a foot long, has just emerged from its den buried within
the forest floor.2 Its fur, glistening in patches of sunlight through the
trees, is highly sought after in the fur market and considered a “luxury

1.

Matthew Scully, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering
of Animals, and the Call to Mercy 15 (2002) (quoting 7 John
Henry Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons 76 (Outlook Verlag
2018) (1839)).

2.

See Katie Critchfield, Sable Facts - Animals of Asia, WorldAtlas (Apr. 25,
2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/sable-facts-animals-of-asia.html
[https://perma.cc/PW3V-3H3L].
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item.”3 For this, the small animal has been called a “jewel, . . .
superlative in every respect.”4
At the sudden sight of hunting dogs, the sable freezes in fear.
Within moments, the frozen animal is shot, with a hunter aiming intentionally—not necessarily to minimize the sable’s pain, but rather to
avoid damaging the animal’s pelt. In life highly energetic and quick, the
sable now lies lifeless on the forest floor. It will soon be skinned of its
pelt,5 and the pelt exported internationally for use in various garments,
including the shtreimel, worn by Hasidic Jewish men.6
The welfare of religiously used animals in the United States is sorely
unprotected as a result of First Amendment limitations. Further, the
current progression of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence does not bode
well for broadening these protections—protections which are already
received by secularly exploited animals but which are not extended to
their religiously exploited counterparts. This Comment will discuss
examples of religious uses of animals and animal products in the United
States. It will then discuss some animal-protection legislative efforts
and how those efforts are forced to coexist with the limitations of the
Free Exercise Clause. The result of this—animal-protection legislation
with exemptions for religious and spiritual uses of animals—leaves
animals severely unprotected from exploitation that would, if secular,
be more stringently regulated. Animals used for religious purposes are,
consequently, among the most vulnerable groups of animals in the
United States.
This Comment will discuss the progression of what it has meant to
discriminate against religious exercise and the current state of Free
Exercise jurisprudence, focusing on Employment Division v. Smith7 and
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.8 Attention
will then be paid to more recent free-exercise developments, including
the enactments of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

3.

Elena Agarkova, Preserving the Symbol of Siberia, Moving On: Sobol’ and
the Barguzinsky Zapovednik (Part I), Inst. of Current World Affs., July
2009, at 1, 1–2, http://www.icwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/EA13.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB35-C52T].

4.

Id. at 2.

5.

Id. at 3 (“Russian sable is mostly skinned over the mouth, without any
incision being made in the body, and the feet and tail are left as part of
the fur . . . .”).

6.

Id. at 2 (“[Russia] exported every type of fur available, including sable,
fox, squirrel, ermine, beaver and muskrat.”); see infra notes 73–81 and
accompanying text.

7.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

8.

508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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(RFRA)9 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 (RLUIPA)10 and the decisions of Roman Catholic Diocese v.
Cuomo,11 Tandon v. Newsom,12 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,13 and
others. Finally, this Comment will address the question of what impact,
if any, those recent free-exercise developments will have on continued
animal-protection-legislation efforts within the context of religious uses
of animals and animal products.

I.

Religious Use of Animals and Animal Products

Throughout the United States and for centuries, various religious
groups have exploited animals and animal products for ceremonies and
rituals, sacrifices, garments, and religious practice generally. Judaism
and Islam practice specific slaughter methods—kosher14 and halal,15
respectively—which differ from conventional, secular slaughter both in
terms of process and in terms of the degree of scrutiny they receive
under the law. Some religious groups, such as Santería, practice ritual
or ceremonial animal sacrifice.16 A minority of Pentecostal Christians
practice snake handling as a means of demonstrating their faith,
opening themselves up fully to the risk of venomous snake bites in small
congregations in Appalachia.17 Some orthodox religious groups utilize
animal fur in headwear and other traditional religious garments.18 These
are just some of the various forms of animal exploitation in religion.
This Comment will address those given examples because of their
prominence and prevalence, but of course this list is not exhaustive.
This Comment will begin its discussion of the various religious uses
of animals in the United States with that of kosher slaughter, which is
perhaps one of the more well-known examples of religious practice involving animals. Kosher slaughter is a fitting place to begin to demonstrate the widespread religious use of animals, since “[t]he modern

9.

Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb–4), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).

10.

Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc to 2000cc–5).

11.

141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).

12.

141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021).

13.

141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).

14.

See infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.

15.

See infra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.

16.

See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.

17.

See infra notes 58–72 and accompanying text.

18.

See infra notes 73–81 and accompanying text.

1059

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
Animal-Protection Efforts and the Free Exercise Clause

American kosher industry represents one of the most visible traditional
religious systems of dietary practice in the West.”19
According to the Jewish faith, keeping kosher “produce[s] a heightened sensitivity to Hashem’s [God’s] creations” and “remind[s] the Jew
of some of the ideals of ‘kedusha’ [holiness] . . . .”20 The word “kosher”
itself means “untainted, . . . fit, approved, or valid” in Hebrew.21
Kosher restrictions affect not only slaughter, but rather all stages of
food production and consumption.22 However, for purposes of this discussion, this Comment will focus on the kosher slaughter process. The
process of kosher slaughter—or “shechita” in biblical Hebrew23—
generally involves a quick incision to sever the major structures and
vessels of the animal’s throat—specifically, the trachea, esophagus,
carotid arteries, and jugular veins.24 The process is performed by a
trained slaughterer called a “shochet.”25
However, kosher-slaughter methods are not entirely uniform. For
example, some shochets do perform pre-slaughter stunning of animals,
while others refuse to do so, out of concern that the practice may not
comply with kashrut (the Jewish dietary laws).26 Some rabbis have
expressly prohibited such pre-slaughter stunning, believing that the
stunned animals would not meet Jewish slaughter requirements.27 It is
said by some that pre-slaughter stunning renders the animal non-kosher
19.

Aaron S. Gross, The Question of the Animal and Religion:
Theoretical Stakes, Practical Implications 17 (2015).

20.

Id. at 22 (quoting Zachary (Rachamim Avraham) Rosenberg, Bar
Mitzvah Speech (Shabbos Mevorchim, Parshas Shemini, 5760), in Dietary
Laws in Parshas Shemini, KOF-K, archived in https://web.archive.org/
web/20040228173447/http://www.kof-k.org/dietary.htm (archived Feb.
28, 2004) [https://perma.cc/X9NC-UTUX])) (alterations and emphasis in
original).

21.

Jonathan Cohen, Kosher Slaughter, State Regulation of Religious Organizations, and the European Court of Human Rights, 4 Intercultural
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 355, 360 (2009).

22.

Id. at 360–61.

23.

Michelle Hodkin, When Ritual Slaughter Isn’t Kosher: An Examination
of Shechita and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 1 J. Animal L.
129, 129 (2005).

24.

Id. at 138 (citing Shechita UK, A Guide to Shechita 5 (2009),
https://www.shechitauk.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/A_Guide_
to_Shechita_2009__01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EGV-KJW2]).

25.

Id. at 137.

26.

See Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, Pre-slaughter Stun Less Humane than Shechita,
Jerusalem Post (Jan. 25, 2012, 02:02), https://www.jpost.com/jewishworld/jewish-news/pre-slaughter-stun-less-humane-than-shechita
[https://perma.cc/MW7Z-MM9L] (discussing the controversy of shechita
methods dictated by law that require pre-slaughter stunning).

27.

Cohen, supra note 21, at 359.
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because “an animal intended for food must be healthy and uninjured at
the time of slaughter” in order to be kosher.28 Ideally, and according to
proponents of kosher slaughter, the incision procedure is meant to result
in immediate loss of consciousness in the animal.29 It is based on this
assumption and principle that the kosher slaughter method is considered “humane” under federal slaughter legislation.30 But the reality is
that immediate loss of consciousness is not always achieved.31
In 2004, controversy arose after a People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals (PETA) investigator exposed particularly inhumane slaughter methods in an Agriprocessors plant in Iowa.32 The plant was
formerly the largest kosher meatpacking plant in the United States.33
Footage from inside the plant revealed slaughter involving the cutting
and tearing of animals’ tracheas whilst the animals were inverted, after
which the procedure was followed by extended periods of consciousness.34 Agriprocessors’ methods consistently left animals conscious for
up to three minutes following the slitting of their throats.35 As if that
were not enough, video also showed these animals subsequently being
prodded in the faces with electric rods.36 The last several minutes of
these animals’ lives were spent in an unspeakable, harrowing state—

28.

Hodkin, supra note 23, at 139 (citing Shechita UK, supra note 24).

29.

Id. at 138 (citing Shechita UK, supra note 24).

30.

See infra Part II.

31.

See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.

32.

Cohen, supra note 21, at 366.

33.

Id.

34.

Id.; Gross, supra note 19, at 31–34. (noting that the element of inverting
the animal for slaughter raises welfare concerns not only because of the
distress it causes the animal, but also because the act of inversion tends
to prolong consciousness after the slaughter procedure).

35.

Gross, supra note 19, at 32–34; Donald McNeil, Jr., Inquiry Finds Lax
Federal Inspections at Kosher Meat Plant, N.Y. Times (Mar. 10, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/us/inquiry-finds-lax-federalinspections-at-kosher-meat-plant.html [https://perma.cc/7YYG-NAEQ].
As McNeil described,
[A]fter steers were cut by a ritual slaughterer, other workers pulled
out the animals’ tracheas with a hook to speed bleeding. . . .
[A]nimals were shown staggering around the killing pen with their
windpipes dangling out, slamming their heads against walls and
soundlessly trying to bellow. One animal took three minutes to stop
moving.
Id.

36.

Jonathan Safran Foer, Eating Animals 69 (2009).
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throats slit, still alive, still conscious, still feeling—until they finally
succumbed to death.37
Based on various witnesses’ testimony, it is believed that Agriprocessors had maintained this process of cutting the tracheas and
esophagi out of conscious animals for at least six years.38 Despite this,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) ultimately never prosecuted Agriprocessors for what it conceded constituted violation of federal
slaughter law.39
Islam, like Judaism, involves specific slaughter practices. This is a
part of the overall practice of halal. Similar to kosher practice, Islamic
law dictates how halal animals are to be cared for and eventually
slaughtered.40 Halal means “permissible” in Arabic.41 Islamic law
“requires [that] the animal be dispatched of quickly with a single cut to
the neck . . . .”42 The incision severs the jugular vein, carotid artery,
and windpipe, and all blood is then drained from the animal.43 As

37.

See Collin Allen & Michael Trestman, Animal Consciousness, Stan.
Encyc. of Phil., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/
consciousness-animal/ [https://perma.cc/S3XX-E3EA] (Oct. 24, 2016)
(“[T]he position that all mammals are conscious is widely agreed upon among
scientists who express views on the distribution of consciousness.”); Gross,
supra note 19, at 31 (“The procedure at AgriProcessors that attracted the
most extreme negative attention was the further cutting and partial removal
of the tracheas and esophagi of cattle immediately after shechita and, in
at least 20 percent of the cases, while the animals were still sensible and
often in visible agony.”).

38.

Gross, supra note 19, at 33.

39.

Id. (“While the USDA never chose to prosecute, they did conclude that
the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, a federal law that applies to the
slaughter of cattle and pigs, was violated . . . .”). This failure to prosecute
could perhaps be explained in part by concern for the “sensitivity of regulating religious rituals” and a desire to avoid the appearance of antisemitism.
See Alan Cooperman, USDA Investigating Kosher Meat Plant, Wash.
Post (Dec. 31, 2004), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
2004/12/31/usda-investigating-kosher-meat-plant/26e6ae03-7040-4b768a2e-52a359e2d531/ [https://perma.cc/72NC-BQHR].

40.

Axl Campos Kaminski, The “Stunning” Reality Behind Halal Meat
Production, 9 Env’t & Earth L.J. 32, 34 (2019).

41.

James Meikle, What Exactly Does the Halal Method of Animal Slaughter
Involve?, Guardian (May 8, 2014, 4:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/lifeandstyle/2014/may/08/what-does-halal-method-animal-slaughterinvolve [https://perma.cc/N7XA-LSXM].

42.

Kaminski, supra note 40, at 35.

43.

Nick Eardley, What is Halal Meat?, BBC News (May 12, 2014), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-27324224 [https://perma.cc/FG9Z-2ZDG].
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required for kosher slaughter, the “[a]nimals must be alive and healthy
at the time of the slaughter” in order to be halal compliant.44
In modern-day halal-slaughter practice, pre-slaughter stunning is
utilized in most American halal slaughterhouses.45 However, as is the
case with kosher slaughter, this practice of pre-slaughter stunning is
accepted by some Islamic schools of thought and forbidden by others.46
Unlike kosher slaughter, however, halal slaughter is not performed by
extensively trained designated religious slaughterers.47
On the whole, animals slaughtered pursuant to kosher and halal
methods have significantly less protection under slaughter law than
secularly slaughtered animals.48 The slaughter of these animals exists in
a sort of bubble; a darker, more covert space on which the eyes of the
law do not linger.49
Some religious groups also practice ritual or ceremonial animal
sacrifice. Among them is Santería, the religious group at issue in Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,50 a case this Comment
discusses further in Part IV. Santería is a religion fused from African,
Cuban, and Roman Catholic influences.51 “[O]ne of the principal forms
of devotion [in Santería] is animal sacrifice.”52 Sacrifices are performed

44.

Id.; Kosher Slaughter Laws and an End to “Shackle-and-Hoist” Restraint,
Animal Legal Def. Fund (Jan. 24, 2015), https://aldf.org/article/
kosher-slaughter-laws-and-an-end-to-shackle-and-hoist-restraint/
[https://perma.cc/9K3Q-D7HZ].

45.

Kaminski, supra note 40, at 36; see also Meikle, supra note 41 (“[M]ost
animals killed by halal methods are stunned before slaughter.”).

46.

See supra note 26 and accompanying text; Kaminski, supra note 40, at 36;
but see Tom Levitt, What is Non-Stun Slaughter and How is it Treated in
UK Law?, The Guardian (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2021/oct/12/what-is-non-stun-slaughter-and-how-is-it-treated-inuk-law [https://perma.cc/VNW6-NZA3] (“Figures from the Food Standards
Agency (FSA) indicate that in 2018 58% of all halal meat in England was
pre-stunned. Shechita, which is the Jewish religious humane method of
animal slaughter for food, does not accept pre-stunning.”).

47.

See supra note 25 and accompanying text; Kaminski, supra note 40, at
37.; but see Eardley, supra note 43 (“There are similarities in the method
of slaughter in that both [kosher and halal slaughter] require use of a
surgically sharp knife and specially-trained slaughtermen.”). However, halal
slaughterers do need to be Muslim. Meikle, supra note 41.

48.

Kaminski, supra note 40, at 40.

49.

See infra notes 103–15 and accompanying text.

50.

508 U.S. 520 (1993).

51.

Id. at 524.

52.

Id. (citing 13 The Encyclopedia of Religion 66 (Mircea Eliade et al.
eds., 1987) (providing details of Santería)).
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on various occasions, including births, marriages, and deaths.53 “Animals sacrificed . . . include chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs,
goats, sheep, and turtles,” and the animals are sacrificed by a severing
of the carotid arteries in the neck.54 The sacrifices are performed by
Santerían priests, “apprenticed in the art of sacrifice under other
trained priests.”55
Santería is not alone in involving ritual animal sacrifice,56 although
it certainly seems to be the most prominent modern example of religious
animal sacrifice in the United States. This is perhaps due to the
Supreme Court bringing this practice to light in Lukumi. Still, open and
exposed practice of Santería, and of its accompanying animal sacrifice,
is not common.57
Snake handling is another example of religious practice involving
animals.58 Practiced by some Pentecostal Christians, venomous snake
handling is a means of proving followers’ absolute faith in God.59 The
practice stems from Mark 16:18, which reads: “They shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they
shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover.”60 Also considered
53.

Id. at 525.

54.

Id.

55.

Shannon L. Doheny, Free Exercise Does Not Protect Animal Sacrifice:
The Misconception of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah and Constitutional Solutions for Stopping Animal Sacrifice, 2 J.
Animal L. 121, 125 (2006).

56.

For example, animal sacrifice is mentioned throughout the Old Testament
and was present in historical Judaism. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
508 U.S. at 524–25. Cases also demonstrate that “many immigrants
continue to practice the animal sacrifices central to the religions of their
homelands.” Tina S. Boradiansky, Comment, Conflicting Values: The
Religious Killing of Federally Protected Wildlife, 30 Nat’l Res. J. 709,
711 (1990) (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff’d, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991)
(mem.), rev’d, 508 U.S. 520).

57.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 525; see also Doheny,
supra note 55, at 124 (“Santería is a secretive religion . . . [and] factual
certainty regarding most aspects of Santería animal sacrifice is difficult,
due to the clandestine nature of the rituals.”).

58.

Admittedly, this example of religious use of animals differs from the aforementioned examples in the sense that oftentimes it is the humans, rather
than the animals, who end up injured (despite many congregants’ belief
that their “[a]bsolute faith in God . . . protects them from harm.”). See
Julia Duin, Appalachian Snake Handlers Put Their Faith in God—and
Increasingly, Doctors, Nat’l Geographic (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.
nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/snake-handlers-appalachiachanging-practices [https://perma.cc/N2VY-DYHM].

59.

Id.

60.

Mark 16:18 (King James).
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relevant to the practice is the passage of Luke 10:19: “I give unto you
power to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the
enemy: and nothing shall by any means hurt you.”61 Those who practice
religious snake handling take these passages literally, believing “Jesus’s
last words to his disciples [to be] a binding injunction on all believers.”62
Proponents of snake handling regularly accompany the practice
with the speaking of tongues, consumption of poison, and handling
fire.63 Religious snake handling is practiced primarily in the Appalachian states, several of which have outlawed the practice.64 Most modern
Pentecostal populations in the United States have denounced snake
handling, so the practice today is limited to roughly 125 churches, most
of which are rural and remote.65 The snakes used include local timber
and canebrake rattlesnakes, diamondback rattlesnakes, cottonmouths,
and copperheads.66 Exotic snakes are also occasionally purchased at
reptile shows for religious serpent-handling purposes.67
Particularly traditional followers intentionally reject medical care
following serpent bites, believing that seeking medical care “shows a
lack of faith in God.”68 But because no Bible verse specifically prohibits
seeking medical care following serpent handling, some proponents see
no issue with it.69
The snakes used in religious snake handling are commonly taken
locally from the wild, and when they are occasionally confiscated from
Pentecostal churches by animal welfare groups, they are oftentimes
“weak” from poor treatment, which may increase their likelihood to bite
handlers.70 These snakes are commonly underfed, dehydrated, confined
61.

Luke 10:19 (King James).

62.

Matthew M. Ball, Note, Targeting Religion: Analyzing Appalachian
Proscriptions on Religious Snake Handling, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1425, 1428
(2015). Another relevant passage (although not in the sense of supporting
the practice of snake handling, but rather in condemning its improper care
and handling of snakes) is “[f]or that which befalleth the sons of men
befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the
other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no preeminence
above a beast: for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust,
and all turn to dust again.” Ecclesiastes 3:19-20 (King James).

63.

Duin, supra note 58.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

Id. But see Ball, supra note 62, at 1441 (“Herpetologists have suggested
that snakes, when kept in captivity and surrounded by humans, become
‘tame’ and therefore bite less often.”).
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in inadequate spaces (“snake box[es]”), and experience shorter life spans
than is expected for properly cared-for snakes.71 Those snakes that cannot be brought back to health upon confiscation—dehydrated beyond
the point of recovery—are euthanized.72
Some orthodox religious groups also utilize animal fur in religious
headwear and other religious garments. Hasidic Jewish men, for example, traditionally wear large, circular fur hats called “shtreimels.”73
Similar to the shtreimel is the spodik, another form of Jewish headwear.74 It is said that those who trace their roots to Poland wear the
spodik, while those with roots in Galicia, Hungary, or Romania wear
the shtreimel.75
In some communities, shtreimels are worn only by married men,
whereas in others they are worn following the point of bar mitzvah.76
For those communities in which the shtreimel is worn following
marriage, the shtreimel serves as a “public relationship status update,”
since Hasidic men don’t wear wedding bands.77 While there are “no
official rules as to when the shtreimel is to be worn,” it is commonly
worn on Shabbat (the Jewish day of rest), on holidays, and at one’s
wedding.78 Such hats are typically made from the fur of Canadian or
Russian sable, stone marten, pine marten, or American gray fox.79 It is
said that the shtreimel is a means for Hasidic Jews to distinguish

71.

Duin, supra note 58; accord John Burnett, Serpent Experts Try to
Demystify Pentecostal Snake Handling, NPR (Oct. 18, 2013, 4:12 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2013/10/18/236997513/serpent-experts-try-todemystify-pentecostal-snake-handling [https://perma.cc/Z4P5-GYCG].

72.

Duin, supra note 58.

73.

Vanessa Friedman, The California Fur Ban and What It Means for You,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/style/
fur-ban-california.html [https://perma.cc/985T-WCJA]; Danna Lorch,
Shtreimel Styles Are Ruled by Trends as Much As Tradition — Even for
Hasidim, Forward, (May 17, 2018), https://forward.com/schmooze/
401441/shtreimel-styles-are-ruled-by-trends-as-much-as-tradition-evenfor-hasidim/ [https://perma.cc/XQ3J-SRT5].

74.

Levi Cooper, Of ‘Spodiks’ and ‘Shtreimels’: The Most Conspicuous
Hassidic Garment Is the Fur Hats Sported by the Men, Jerusalem Post
(July 17, 2014, 13:46), https://www.jpost.com/jewish-world/judaism/ofspodiks-and-shtreimels-363183 [https://perma.cc/ZED7-9V6H].

75.

Id.

76.

Jewish Concepts: Shtreimel, Jewish Virtual Libr., https://www.
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shtreimel (last visited March 22, 2022) [https://
perma.cc/V6VP-9T4D].

77.

Lorch, supra note 73.

78.

Jewish Concepts, supra note 76; Lorch, supra note 73.

79.

Jewish Concepts, supra note 76.
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themselves from other sects of Judaism.80 Regardless of when worn, the
shtreimel is a sign of connection to God.81
How is the genuine animal fur used for these hats acquired? Today,
most consumer-use fur comes from farms around the world, exporting
fur internationally, rather than from the wild.82 Mink and fox comprise
approximately 80% of this farmed fur.83 Fur farming involves the
practice of breeding and raising certain fur-bearing species in captivity
solely for the purpose of utilizing their fur.84
In July of 2020, Humane Society International conducted an
undercover investigation revealing horrific scenes of an Asian fur farm
in which arctic foxes were skinned alive after being beaten with metal
rods into semi-consciousness.85 Even if not subject to such horrific treatment as in that case, animals farmed for their fur live miserable lives.
Methods of slaughter in different countries for fur farming varies from
anal electrocution to gassing to neck breaking, after which the animals
are skinned of their fur.86 During the animals’ lives, they are confined
to small, filthy wire cages, with little ventilation or sunlight, and no
opportunity to follow their natural behavioral instincts, such as for
movement.87 Mink, for example, which are among the most farmed
animals for fur, are “highly territorial, solitary in the wild except during
mating time . . . [and] spend their days roaming and swimming.”88
When bred in captivity for their fur, these animals are forced to exist
in an environment completely at odds with their natural instincts and
behaviors.

80.

Id.

81.

Cooper, supra note 74.

82.

Fur Types in Brief, Fur Comm’n USA, https://furcommission.com/furtypes-in-brief/ [https://perma.cc/Q37C-NU7Q] (last visited Feb. 21, 2022).

83.

Id.

84.

Mink Farming Fuels Rural Economies, Fur Comm’n USA, https://
furcommission.com/mink-farming-2/ [https://perma.cc/JP2P-N4VX] (last
visited Feb. 21, 2022).

85.

Karen E. Lange, EXPOSED: Undercover Investigation at Fur Farm Shows
the Lives Behind the Label, Humane Soc’y of the U.S. (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.humanesociety.org/news/exposed-undercover-investigationfur-farm-shows-lives-behind-label [https://perma.cc/JHQ8-8STR].

86.

Id.; The Fur Trade, Humane Soc’y Int’l, https://www.hsi.org/newsmedia/fur-trade/ [https://perma.cc/F6F8-2TRN] (last visited Feb. 21, 2022).

87.

Lange, supra note 85; Rachael Bale, Fur Farms Still Unfashionably Cruel,
Critics Say, Nat’l Geographic (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.national
geographic.com/animals/article/wildlife-china-fur-farming-welfare?
loggedin=true [https://perma.cc/QV8W-RSD2].

88.

Bale, supra note 87.
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At sable fur farms, the animals are kept in small sheds in cages,
unable to move around for warmth as is their instinct in the wild.89 As
previously mentioned, the fur of sable, or marten, is commonly used for
shtreimel production.90 Although sable is commonly farmed for its fur,
the most “exquisite specimens of sable are still found only in the
Russian wild.”91 These wild sable pelts are the most sought after in the
world.92 A cousin of the weasel and the mink, sable fur is silkier than
its relatives and historically was only worn by royalty.93 Their fur has
been highly coveted since the Middle Ages.94
During the hunting season, roughly a quarter of a million sable are
killed in the wild, “along with millions of squirrel, mink and a host of
other fur-bearing species.”95 This represents approximately a quarter of
the total wild Russian sable population—with roughly 75% left as
“breeding stock in the wild.”96 In modern times, wild sable occupy only
half of their natural geographical range due to overexploitation of the
creature in the 17th century.97 While Russia is considered to have the
monopoly on sable, fur production generally is also dominated by
Denmark, the United States, Holland, Finland, and China.98
One prominent rabbi stated publicly that shtreimels should no
longer be made with genuine animal fur and advocated instead for synthetic versions.99 He claimed that the use of animal fur for shtreimels
violated Jewish law, which prohibited causing animals unnecessary
pain.100 Few seem to share his opinion, however. “People continue to

89.

Chloe Pantazi, A BBC Reporter Got a Startling Look Inside a Russian Fur
Farm, Bus. Insider (Apr. 27, 2016, 12:23 PM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/russias-wild-sable-fur-farms-2016-4 [https://perma.cc/A2KB-4CRA].

90.

Jewish Concepts, supra note 76.

91.

Patrick E. Tyler, Behind the $100,000 Sable Coat, a Siberian Hunter,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2000, at A8, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/
27/world/behind-the-100000-sable-coat-a-siberian-hunter.html [https://
perma.cc/9FYP-VLCA].

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Agarkova, supra note 3, at 2.

95.

Tyler, supra note 91.

96.

Id.

97.

Agarkova, supra note 3, at 3.

98.

Tyler, supra note 91.

99.

Rabbi Shlomo Pappenheim Says Traditional Shtreimel Fur Hats Desecrate
God’s Name Due to Animal Cruelty, HuffPost (Aug. 23, 2013, 7:10 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/rabbi-schlomo-pappenheim-fur-hatsshtreimel-chilul-hashem_n_3799438 [https://perma.cc/5LKY-BRUX].

100. Id.
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wear shtreimels, even though the cost starts at $1,600 per hat. A law
banning the sale of fur is the last thing that will stop us . . . .”101

II. Federal Animal-Welfare Legislation
Although most animal-protection legislation occurs at the state
level, various pieces of federal law function together to ensure the maintenance of animal welfare—or at least, to minimize harm against certain
categories of animals in some circumstances.102 One such piece of legislation is the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978 (HMSA).103
HMSA provides for two acceptable methods of slaughter: 1) conventional slaughter, “whereby the animal is rendered insensible to pain
before death”; and 2) ritual slaughter, “where the animal loses consciousness from hypoxia brought on by loss of blood.”104
Specifically, HMSA provides that in order to be considered humane
slaughter, animals must either be “rendered insensible to pain by a
single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is
rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut”;
or the slaughter must accord with the requirements of a “religious faith
that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss
of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and
instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument
. . . .”105 In other words, religious ritual slaughter whereby the animal
goes unconscious and bleeds out is not considered an exception to
humane-slaughter requirements, but rather is itself considered a
humane-slaughter method.106 Both kosher and halal prescribed methods

101. Mordechai Goldman, Why Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox Are Fighting Fur Ban,
Al-Monitor (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2017/
02/israel-us-ultra-orthodox-hassidic-fur-hat-knesset-law.html
[https://
perma.cc/2B2E-ML4G].
102. Laws that Protect Animals, Animal Legal Def. Fund, https://aldf.org/
article/laws-that-protect-animals/ [https://perma.cc/4CCZ-PJFK] (last
visited Jan. 7, 2022).
103. Pub. L. 95-445, 92 Stat. 1069, 1069 (amending various sections of U.S.
Code titles 7 and 21).
104. Kaminski, supra note 40, at 32 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1906, which cites to 7
U.S.C. § 1902).
105. 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a)–(b) (emphasis added).
106. See 7 U.S.C. § 1902 note 2 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-80) (Notes
to Decisions) (“7 USCS § 1902(b) is not exception to § 1902(a); since it is
phrased in the disjunctive, statute makes neither (a) nor (b) exception to
other; described methods are alternative methods . . . and each one is supported by . . . determination that stated method of slaughter is humane.”
(citing Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1286–88 (1974), aff’d, 419 U.S.
806 (1974) (mem.))).
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of slaughter would, ostensibly, comport with this ritual-slaughter definition.107 This is so despite the fact that cutting off the blood flow to
an animal’s brain will kill it, but not instantly. It is precisely for this
reason that HMSA includes a pre-slaughter stunning mandate for
secularly slaughtered animals in the first place.108
Furthermore, the conventional-slaughter provision is expressly
limited to “cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock,”109 which has been found to not include poultry.110 In other words,
despite chickens’, turkeys’, and other birds’ ability to feel pain just like
the non-exempted animals, and despite their being among the mostfarmed animals in the United States,111 this federal humane-slaughter
legislation provides them no protection whatsoever.112
As with poultry, slaughter of fish is also not regulated by HMSA.
In fact, no federal law exists to ensure humane slaughter of fish.113 As
astutely written by George Orwell, “all animals are equal but some
animals are more equal than others.”114 A review of federal slaughter
law suggests that the “mo[st] equal” animals are secularly-exploited
swine, cattle, sheep, and other livestock; followed by, interestingly
enough, religiously-exploited swine, cattle, sheep, and other livestock;
and lastly, least equal of them all, poultry and fish.
HMSA goes on to specify that “in order to protect freedom of religion, ritual slaughter and the handling or other preparation of livestock
for ritual slaughter are exempted from the terms of this chapter.”115 In
other words, animals used in the process of ritual slaughter or religious
sacrifice receive no protection whatsoever under HMSA, existing in an
unregulated bubble, with no federal safeguards to ensure their welfare.
While some animal-science experts believe that properly administered religious slaughter can be “humane,” others assert that it is impossible for such slaughter, even if executed precisely, to be as “humane

107. See text accompanying supra notes 40–49.
108. See Safran Foer, supra note 36, at 232.
109. 7 U.S.C. § 1902.
110. 7 U.S.C. § 1902 note 2 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-80) (Notes to
Decisions) (citing Levine v. Conner, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116–17 (2008),
vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Levine v. Vilsack, 587
F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2009)).
111. Laws that Protect Animals, supra note 102.
112. See Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, U.S. Dep’t. Agric.: Nat’l Agric.
Libr., https://www.nal.usda.gov/legacy/awic/humane-methods-slaughteract [https://perma.cc/62ZQ-MBVL] (last visited Jan. 7, 2022); Levine,
540 F. Supp. at 1116–17.
113. Safran Foer, supra note 36, at 190.
114. George Orwell, Animal Farm 112 (1946).
115. 7 U.S.C. § 1906.
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as well-conducted conventional slaughter.”116 Author Peter Singer wrote
that, while “[a]t the time this [religious] method of slaughter was laid
down in Jewish law it was probably more humane than any alternative;
now, however, it is less humane, under the best circumstances, than,
for example, the use of the captive-bolt pistol to render an animal
instantly insensible.”117
Congress enacted the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) in 1966.118 AWA
is considered the “primary federal animal protection law”119 and applies
in far broader circumstances than HMSA, as it sets “standards for the
humane care and treatment for certain animals that are exhibited to
the public, sold for use as pets, used in research, or transported commercially.”120 AWA directs the Secretary of the USDA to set minimum
standards regarding animal “handling, care, treatment, and transportation.”121
However, despite its broader application, AWA still contains significant gaps. The following animals are not covered by AWA: farm
animals used for food or fiber (such as fur); coldblooded species; fish;
invertebrates; and certain birds, rats, and mice bred for use in
research.122 “Animal” is defined instead as including “any live or dead
dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal), guinea pig, hamster,
rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary may
determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research, testing,
experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet.”123
One section of AWA, for example, prohibits the exhibition of an
animal in an “animal fighting venture,” as well as the knowing sale,
possession, training, transportation, delivery, or receipt of any animal
for purposes of having it participate in an animal-fighting venture.124
Section 2160, entitled “Prohibition on slaughter of dogs and cats for
human consumption” makes illegal the knowing slaughter of a cat or
116. Kaminski, supra note 40, at 36; see also Levitt, supra note 46 (“In general,
there is consensus among vets that non-stun methods of slaughtering livestock are worse for welfare.”).
117. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 153–54 (updated ed. 2009).
118. Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2156).
119. Laws that Protect Animals, supra note 102.
120. Animal Welfare Act, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.: Animal & Plant Health
Inspection Serv., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animal
welfare/sa_awa [https://perma.cc/P6D6-2MLB] (last modified Jan. 12,
2022).
121. Laws that Protect Animals, supra note 102 (quoting Animal Welfare Act
§ 13, 80 Stat. at 352 (codified at as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2143)).
122. Animal Welfare Act, supra note 120.
123. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g).
124. Id. § 2156(a)–(b).

1071

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
Animal-Protection Efforts and the Free Exercise Clause

dog for human consumption, as well as the knowing shipping, transporting, delivering, possessing, purchase, or sale of a dog or cat for human
consumption.125 That section explicitly creates an exception for American Indian tribes, however, in “carrying out any activity [prohibited by
this section] for the purpose of a religious ceremony.”126
Another example of federal legislation which protects animals is the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).127 The ESA obligates the
Secretary of the Interior to classify species as “endangered species or a
threatened species,”128 and to further “issue such regulations as [s]he
deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such
species.”129 The ESA prohibits the taking of endangered species, except
under narrow statutory exemptions, and orders “all persons and federal
agencies to act in the interest of preserving endangered species.”130 One
commentator described the ESA as embodying the idea that a “listed
nonhuman resident of the United States is guaranteed, in a special
sense, life and liberty.”131 This commentator did not, apparently,
contemplate those “listed nonhuman resident[s]” exploited for religious
purposes, for those animals are certainly not guaranteed life nor
liberty.132 Interestingly, legislative history for the ESA shows consideration, but ultimately rejection, of an explicit religious-use exemption
for Native Americans in the continental United States133
Similar to but more limited than the ESA is the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA).134 It prohibits the taking (including killing,
hunting, and capturing) of protected migratory bird species, “by any
means or in any manner,” unless such taking has been authorized by

125. Id. § 2160(a).
126. Id. § 2160(c).
127. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–
1544).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).
129. Id. § 1533(d).
130. Boradiansky, supra note 56, at 723.
131. Boradinasky, supra note 56, at 722 (quoting Joseph M. Petulla,
American Environmentalism: Values, Tactics, Priorities 51 (1980)).
132. See generally Part IV (discussing the vulnerability of religiously exploited
animals due to the First Amendment).
133. Boradiansky, supra note 56, at 724 & n.132.
134. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711).
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the Department of the Interior.135 The Act protects not only the bird
itself, but also “any part” thereof, as well as the bird’s eggs.136
In 2004, the Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act137 amended the
MBTA to clarify that its protection extended only to migratory bird
species that are native to the United States or its territories.138 Despite
that limitation, the Act still applies to a multitude of species. Most
recently, the list was extended to include 1,093 different species.139 However, despite its application to such a wide range of bird species, the
MBTA’s protection is lessened somewhat by its delegation of authority
to the Secretary of the Interior to determine periodically when the taking of protected animals could be undertaken.140 Furthermore, the Act
explicitly does not “prevent the breeding [and sale] of migratory game
birds on farms” for food.141
Another recent example of federal animal-protection legislation is
the Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act (PACT).142 PACT was
enacted to address some of the most egregious forms of animal cruelty—
animal crushing, drowning, suffocation, or sexual exploitation—in
circumstances affecting interstate commerce.143 PACT defines “animal
crushing” broadly to include conduct in which a non-human mammal,

135. § 2, 40 Stat. 755, 755 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 703(a)); see
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., https://
www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/migratorybird-treaty-act.php [https://perma.cc/5LTG-NXSV] (last visited Feb. 15,
2022).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a).
137. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809.
138. Sec. 143(b)(2), § 2(b)(1), 118 Stat. at 3071 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 703(b)(1)).
139. Interior Department Ensures Migratory Bird Treaty Act Works for Birds
and People, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Sept. 29, 2021), https://
www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-department-ensures-migratory-birdtreaty-act-works-birds-and-people [https://perma.cc/T3R5-TZTF]; see
50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2020) (listing the covered species).
140. 16 U.S.C. § 704. A further amendment, through the Fish and Wildlife
Improvement Act of 1978, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue
regulations (“in accordance with the various migratory bird treaties”) to
allow Alaskan natives to take migratory birds “for their own nutritional and
other essential needs, as determined by the Secretary of the Interior, during
seasons established so as to provide for the preservation and maintenance
of stocks of migratory birds”—a taking which otherwise would have been
prohibited. Pub. L. No. 95-616, § 3(h)(2), 92 Stat. 3110, 3112 (codified at
16 U.S.C. § 712(1)).
141. 16 U.S.C. § 711 (2019).
142. Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151 (2019) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 48).
143. Laws that Protect Animals, supra note 102.
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bird, reptile, or amphibian is “purposely crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled, or otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury. . . .”144
Like other federal animal-protection statutes, PACT only goes so
far, leaving animals in various contexts unprotected. For example,
exemptions for its animal crushing prohibition include “customary and
normal” agricultural and veterinary practices; animal slaughter for
food; “hunting, trapping, fishing, . . . or pest control;” medical or scientific research; and that which is necessary to protect a person’s life or
property.145
These federal enactments are written to apply in limited circumstances, excluding from their protection various animals in various
contexts. In some instances, they explicitly exempt religiously used
animals from their protection. But regardless of whether they explicitly
address animals used for religious purposes, these enactments are all
subject to the constraints of the First Amendment, resulting in even
thinner protection for religiously used animals, as this Comment discusses further in Part IV.

III. Animal Protection Efforts
Animal-welfare and animal-rights groups petition vigorously for
bans on practices—both religious and secular—which unnecessarily
exploit animals and for extensions of animal-protection legislation. But
their efforts, particularly efforts by lobbyists for broader animal-protection legislation, are severely constrained in the context of religious use
of animals.
PETA petitioned vigorously, and ultimately unsuccessfully, for
prosecution of Agriprocessors in the previously discussed reveal of illegal
kosher slaughter, which left animals conscious for several minutes following the slitting of their throats.146 Of course, secular meat processing
facilities have experienced more than their fair share of such scandals
as well.147 This Comment certainly does not intend to suggest that religious slaughter facilities like Agriprocessors are alone in this controversy.148 For every instance of religious exploitation of animals, there
144. Sec. 2, § 48(f)(1), 133 Stat. at 1152 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48(f)(1)).
145. Sec. 2, § 48(d)(1), 133 Stat. at 1152 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48(d)(1)).
146. Kaminski, supra note 40, at 33–34, 49–50 (detailing the precise factual
descriptions in PETA’s brief of recorded kosher slaughter practice at
Agriprocessors); see supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text.
147. Safran Foer, supra note 36, at 180, 231.
148. That said, there are likely additional instances of similar conduct at other
religious slaughterhouses, on which light has not yet been shed. Author
Safran Foer wrote that there is “no reason to believe that the kind of cruelty
that was documented at Agriprocessors has been eliminated from the kosher
industry.” Id. at 69. And in advocating for the exercise of scrutiny over
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are a myriad of such instances in a secular context. But what this
Comment does intend to emphasize is that at least there is legislation
in place to protect secularly exploited animals (in at least some
contexts). That protection is not extended to religiously slaughtered
animals. As discussed in the previous section, religious slaughter of
animals is explicitly exempted from the scrutiny of HMSA.149 The
degree of legal oversight which is afforded to animals in secular contexts
is simply not afforded to animals used for religious purposes. That latter
group of animals simply has the misfortune of being used for religious
purposes and the accompanying misfortune of not receiving the same
degree of protection as their counterparts in secular contexts.
The practice of kosher slaughter, or shechita, has itself been banned
or at least faced potential prohibition in some countries out of concern
for animal welfare by groups contending that animal slaughter without
pre-stunning causes unnecessary animal suffering.150 The same is true in
various countries for Halal slaughter—without pre-slaughter stunning,
several countries have forbade the practice.151 These prohibitions are
based on evidence that animals that are not stunned before slaughter
feel the full, unqualified pain of the cut to their throats; experience
delayed losses in consciousness; and suffer intense distress and bleeding
following the cuts.152
As mentioned regarding snake handling, many of the states in
which the practice occurs most frequently have banned the practice.153
They have generally done so on grounds of public safety, asserting that
the keeping of venomous snakes by those “unfamiliar with best practices
for keeping dangerous animals” represents a threat to the community.154

religious slaughterhouses, author Peter Singer wrote: “[O]bviously one does
not have to be anti-Semitic or anti-[Muslim] to oppose what is done to
animals in the name of religion.” Singer, supra note 117, at 155.
149. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
150. Hodkin, supra note 23, at 139.
151. Azeezah Kanji, Opinion, Kosher and Halal Bans: Fur-Washing Factory
Farming’s Brutality, Aljazeera (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/
opinions/2021/11/3/kosher-and-halal-bans-fur-washing-factory-farmingsbrutality [https://perma.cc/HQ8K-9QTH].
152. Non-stun Slaughter, Brit. Veterinary Ass’n, https://www.bva.co.uk/
take-action/our-policies/non-stun-slaughter/ [https://perma.cc/T778-RW32]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2022); see also Singer, supra note 117, at 154; supra
note 117 and accompanying text.
153. See Duin, supra note 58; supra note 64 and accompanying text.
154. Tamara Tabo, Snakes in a Church: Should the Law Protect the Religious
Liberty of Serpent-Handlers?, Above the L. (Nov. 14, 2013, 10:28 AM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2013/11/snakes-in-a-church-should-the-lawprotect-the-religious-liberty-of-serpent-handlers/ [https://perma.cc/2RHN3CLE].
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Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency officials seized over fifty poisonous snakes from a Pentecostal pastor in one instance, citing him for
illegally possessing dangerous animals.155 The pastor argued that in so
doing, the state was violating his right to free exercise of religion, but
the case was eventually dismissed.156 No case involving religious snake
handling—and specifically, the banning of such practice by several
states—has ever reached the Supreme Court,157 although numerous
cases involving snake handling have been heard in lower courts,158 as
well as in some states’ highest courts.159 It is not clear, however, that
similar cases would turn out the same way if decided today.160
Additionally, fur bans have been proposed and implemented around
the world, as larger portions of modern society come to recognize that
“[f]or centuries, we have used and abused animals to satisfy our own
vanity.”161 In 2019, California became the first U.S. state to ban fur
sales.162 The state, starting in 2023, will prohibit the manufacture for
sale of fur products within the state.163 It will also prohibit the sale,
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 114 (Tenn. 1975)
(remanding to trial court with instructions to permanently enjoin all
parties from handling dangerous or poisonous snakes within the confines
of Tennessee); Hill v. State, 88 So. 2d 880, 883, 885 (Ala. Ct. App. 1956)
(conviction of defendant under law prohibiting handling poisonous or
dangerous snakes in such manner as to endanger life and health of various
persons did not violate the First Amendment); Lawson v. Commonwealth,
164 S.W.2d 972, 976 (Ky. 1942) (affirming conviction of appellants under
law prohibiting the use of snakes in connection with religious services).
159. See Tabo, supra note 154 (discussing Swann, 527 S.W.2d 99, in which the
Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the state’s ban on snake handling on
grounds of public safety).
160. Id. (“Since the law is one of general applicability, not singling out religious
believers, it likely does not violate the First Amendment, at least under
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division v. Smith[, 494
U.S. 872 (1990)].”).
161. Scully, supra note 1, at 40 (quoting House of Commons Debate, 5 March
1999, UK Parliament, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/
cmhansrd/vo990305/debtext/90305-09.htm [https://perma.cc/A65Q-3X87]
(last visited May 24, 2022)).
162. California Becomes First US State to Ban Animal Fur Products,
Guardian (Oct. 12, 2019, 23:37), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2019/oct/13/fur-ban-california-outlaws-making-and-selling-new-products
[https://perma.cc/97QK-ZPKD] (discussing Act effective Jan. 1, 2023,
ch. 764, sec. 1, § 2023(b)(1), 2019 Cal. Stat. 6381, 6383 (codified at Cal.
Fish & Game Code § 2023(b)(1))).
163. Sec. 1, § 2023(b)(2) (to be codified at Cal. Fish & Game Code
§ 2023(b)(2)).
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trade, or display for sale of a fur product within the state (excluding
used fur products and some other exceptions).164 Notably, the prohibitions explicitly do not apply to “[a] fur product used for religious
purposes” nor to that “used for traditional tribal, cultural, or spiritual
purposes by a member of a federally recognized Native American
tribe.”165
Despite the vigor of modern animal-protection efforts, such efforts
are severely limited when it comes to the religious use of animals and
animal products. The question is posed: Why should the federal government or the states be required to tolerate rampant animal welfare
abuses in the name of religion?166 The source and history of such limitation follows.

IV. Historical Progression of Free-Exercise
Jurisprudence
The First Amendment reads, in relevant part, that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . . .”167 The latter portion is known as the Free
Exercise Clause. The concept of free religious exercise in the United
States—or rather, what would become the United States—dates back
to the 1600s.168 Maryland “passed a statute containing the first ‘free
exercise’ clause on the continent” in 1649,169 well before the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was ever contemplated.
A.

Employment Division v. Smith

For over three decades, modern free-exercise jurisprudence has
revolved around the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division
v. Smith170 and its holding that “neutral and generally applicable”
restrictions incidentally burdening religious practice do not violate the
First Amendment.171 Smith involved the religious use of peyote, which
state law criminalized regardless of whether its use was secular or

164. Sec. 1, § 2023(b)(1), (c) (to be codified at Cal. Fish & Game Code
§ 2023(b)(2), (c)).
165. Sec. 1, § 2023(c) (to be codified at Cal. Fish & Game Code § 2023(c)).
166. Henry Mark Holzer, Contradictions Will Out: Animal Rights vs. Animal
Sacrifice in the Supreme Court, 1 Animal L. 83, 102 (1995).
167. U.S. Const. amend. I.
168. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1425 (1990).
169. Id.
170. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
171. Doheny, supra note 55, at 131; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
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religious.172 The respondents had been fired from their jobs because they
“ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native
American Church.”173 They were subsequently deemed ineligible for
unemployment benefits because of that “misconduct.”174 They claimed
that this denial of benefits violated their free-exercise rights, but the
Supreme Court disagreed.175
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that “[a] law . . .
violates the Free Exercise Clause only if [that law] is ‘specifically directed’ at a particular religious practice.”176 Therefore, if a law involves
only “neutral and generally applicable” prohibition against conduct
generally, and religious conduct just so happens to fall within that general prohibition, the law is not violative of the Free Exercise Clause.177
The Court wrote “that if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not
the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not
been offended.”178
Such a law—of neutral and general motive and application—need
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest, even though the
law may have the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious
practice.179 It need only be supported by a “legitimate public interest.”180
This test enunciated in Smith made it far easier for governments to
burden religious practices without violating the First Amendment, and
hindered an individual’s ability to successfully challenge such burdening
laws.181 “The meaning of Smith was clear: there need not be legal accommodation for conduct simply because it was religious.”182
This would seem to suggest, then, that laws and regulations prohibiting animal cruelty, prohibitions on use of animal fur, and similar
animal protection legislation and regulation could prohibit all such
instances—both religious and secular—so long as those prohibitions
172. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 884–85, discussed in James D. Gordon III, The
New Free Exercise Clause, 26 Cap. U. L. Rev. 65, 65 (1997).
173. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 874–85, 890.
176. Gordon III, supra note 172, at 65 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 878).
177. Doheny, supra note 55, at 131.
178. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
179. Id. at 886 n.3 (“Our conclusion that generally applicable, religion-neutral
laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest is the only approach
compatible with . . . precedent[].”).
180. Doheny, supra note 55, at 131.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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were not pretexts for religious persecution. Under Smith, no carve outs
nor exemptions for religious and spiritual practices would seem to be
necessary for First Amendment compliance.183 For advocates of animal
welfare and animal rights, this is as favorable an outcome as could
realistically be hoped for. But as we will see in Part IV(C), Smith—as
contemplated by the Court in 1990—would not remain undisturbed for
long.
B.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah

Just three years after the decision in Smith, another significant freeexercise case reached the Supreme Court, the decision of which made
clear that prohibitions purporting to be neutral but which were actually
pretexts for religious persecution ran afoul of the Free Exercise
Clause.184 That case was Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah,185 the holding of which has been largely misunderstood since
then.186 As mentioned briefly above, Lukumi involved the city of
Hialeah’s prohibition against ritual animal sacrifice.187 Instead of being
a prohibition of truly “general applicability,” as the Court had found
to be the case in Smith, the prohibition enacted by the City of Hialeah
had “an impermissible object.”188
The ordinance had been enacted with a clear underlying hostility
towards the Santería religion and its practices.189 This hostility was not
merely implicit and contextual. It is true that the ordinance was enacted shortly after news broke that a Santería church had planned to
establish itself—and its practice of animal sacrifice—in a church in
Hialeah, and that the news prompted an emergency public session by
the city council.190 But the evidence of hostility towards Santería was
far clearer than just that. The ordinance explicitly acknowledged the
183. However, “in circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a
general requirement are available, the government ‘may not refuse to extend
that system to cases of “religious hardship” without compelling reason.’”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Haileah, 508 U.S. 520, 537
(1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
184. See infra notes 196–97 and accompanying text.
185. 508 U.S. at 520.
186. Doheny, supra note 55, at 121, 136–37 (asserting that Lukumi “may be
the most misunderstood legal precedent in recent history” and that the case
was not decided on the merits of animal sacrifice).
187. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 527 (“The resolution
declared the city policy ‘to oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals’ within
Hialeah and announced that any person or organization practicing animal
sacrifice ‘will be prosecuted.’”).
188. Id. at 524.
189. Id. at 541–42.
190. Id. at 525–26.
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concern of some Hialeah residents “that certain religions may propose
to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals.”191
Even more damning was the fact that the prohibitions explicitly excluded kosher slaughter, showing that “Santeria alone was the exclusive
legislative concern.”192 The prohibitions as a whole, in their purportedly
wide application, were merely a pretext, intended to target Santería’s
practice of animal sacrifice specifically, in the name of preventing animal cruelty generally.
Lukumi differed from Smith in an extremely important respect.
Although the case, like Smith, was decided on the merits, the specific
merits on which it was decided have been commonly misunderstood,
arguably to the detriment of the progression of animal-protection law
and its intersection with the Free Exercise Clause. Lukumi was not
decided on the basis of ratifying animal sacrifice as a religious practice
under the Free Exercise Clause.193 And yet it seems commonly to be
misunderstood as having done just that.194 Whether the practice of religious animal sacrifice was protected under the Free Exercise Clause was
not actually the question at issue, and it was not answered in that case.
Instead, Lukumi was decided on the basis of the underlying hostility
towards the Santería religion by the City of Hialeah.195 The fact that
animal sacrifice was the specific religious practice at issue was ultimately immaterial. What mattered for purposes of the Court’s decision was
the city’s vaguely-masked persecution of Santería practices and the fact
that the city had essentially “devise[d] mechanisms . . . to persecute or
oppress a religion or its practices.”196 The Court reasserted that the Free
Exercise Clause prohibited “covert suppression of particular religious
beliefs” and that the Court “must [therefore] survey meticulously the
circumstances” to determine the true motive of the prohibitions.197
The case was therefore unlike Smith, which determined that the
prohibition at issue was neutral and generally applicable to all.198 It is
important, for the progression of animal-protection law in the context

191. Id. at 526.
192. Id. at 536.
193. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
195. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 541–42 (focusing on the
hostility—both covert and overt—expressed by the Hialeah-city-council
members towards Santería and its practice of animal sacrifice).
196. Id. at 547. Such mechanisms, whether “overt or disguised,” are violative
of the First Amendment. Id.
197. Id. at 534 (first quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (opinion
of Burger, C.J.); and then quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
198. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
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of the Free Exercise Clause, to emphasize that the Court’s condemnation of Hialeah’s prohibitions did not necessarily constitute a ratification of Santería’s practice of animal sacrifice.
Because Hialeah’s prohibitions impermissibly targeted the conduct
of a specific religion, the Court evaluated them under strict scrutiny.199
To survive scrutiny, the prohibitions—as burdening a specific religious
practice—needed to be justified by a compelling governmental interest
and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.200 The city’s prohibitions
failed the narrow-tailoring test. The prohibitions were underinclusive in
the sense that “although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited, killings that
are no more necessary or humane in almost all other circumstances are
unpunished.”201 Further, the Court noted that “[t]he legitimate governmental interests in protecting the public health and preventing cruelty
to animals could be addressed by restrictions stopping far short of a flat
prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial practice.”202 The prohibitions
reached Santería sacrifices even when such sacrifices would not threaten
public health, evidencing improper tailoring as it related to that proffered governmental interest.203
C.

Challenging Smith—RFRA and RLUIPA

The Court’s decision in Smith—sharply limiting First Amendment
protection for religious practices—was subject to prompt criticism and
attack.204 Judicially, the case has had a somewhat tumultuous lifespan.
Three Justices dissented in Smith itself, claiming that the decision
rested entirely on mischaracterization of free-exercise precedent.205
Three years later, criticism of the decision continued in Lukumi, and
Justice Souter (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)

199. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546. “[I]f the object of a
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation, the law is not neutral and it is invalid unless it is justified by
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”
Id. at 533 (citation omitted). “[A] law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not” meet this rigorous test and “need not be justified
by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Id. at 531.
200. Id. at 533.
201. Id. at 536. The Court elaborated: “The ordinances . . . fail to prohibit
nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests [of protecting public
health and preventing animal cruelty] in a similar or greater degree than
Santeria sacrifice does.” Id. at 543.
202. Id. at 538.
203. Id. at 538–39.
204. Doheny, supra note 55, at 131.
205. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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wrote that he had “doubts about whether the Smith rule merits adherence” and advocated for the Court to reexamine Smith.206 Justices
Blackmun and O’Connor (concurring in the judgment) similarly
asserted that Smith had been wrongly decided.207 Further calls for
Smith’s overruling were renewed in 2021 in Fulton, and although the
case did not ultimately require such a decision to be made, several
Justices nevertheless shared criticism of Smith.208
Legislatively, action was quickly taken to negate the effects of
Smith.209 In 1993, three years after the decision of Smith and within the
same year as Church of the Lukui Babalu Aye, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).210 RFRA operated
to override the new free-exercise test that had narrowly garnered a
majority in Smith.211 Now, instead of requiring only a legitimate public
interest in cases of generally applicable and neutral laws incidentally
burdening religion, RFRA “mandated that a government could not
substantially burden a person’s religious conduct without a ‘compelling
government[al] interest,’”212 regardless of whether the burden on religion
resulted from a neutral rule of general applicability.213 To survive under
RFRA, the governmental burden on religion needed to be the “least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”214 As far as Congress was concerned, Smith’s free-exercise standard—favorable for animal-protection proponents seeking to limit both
secular and religious exploitation of animals—was no more, lasting only
three years.
However, RFRA—as fully contemplated by Congress—was also
short lived. Four years after its passage, the Supreme Court limited
RFRA’s application to only the federal sphere, holding that RFRA was

206. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
207. Id. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
208. See infra notes 248–63 and accompanying text; Fulton v. City of Phila.,
141 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 1926 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
209. Doheny, supra note 55, at 131.
210. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb–4), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997), discussed in Doheny, supra note 55, at 131.
211. Doheny, supra note 55, at 131 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, invalidated by
Boerne, 521 U.S. 507).
212. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, invalidated by Boerne,
521 U.S. 507).
213. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515–16 (emphasis added).
214. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
1(a), (b))).
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invalid as it applied to state law.215 In other words, Smith’s more lenient
free-exercise test would still be applicable to state law burdening
religious practice, while RFRA would override Smith as it applied to
federal law burdening religious practice. However, Smith would continue to apply to state law only in those states that did not opt to take
matters into their own hands by passing their own religious freedomrestoration legislation.216
In a further attempt at extension of free exercise following the above
judicially imposed limitation, Congress passed the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).217 RLUIPA,
unlike the judicially constrained version of RFRA, was to apply to the
states and their subdivisions.218 RLUIPA, as reflected in its name, has
a limited application—it concerns only government land-use regulation,
and religious exercise by institutionalized persons.219 RLUIPA has little,
if any, potential application to protection of religiously used animals,
but its passage nonetheless demonstrates a growing prioritization of
protecting religious practice over competing interests.
Like RFRA, RLUIPA imposed a more stringent standard than
Smith, for the purpose of broadening the religious protection that Smith
had circumscribed. In keeping with RFRA, RLUIPA implemented a
narrow-tailoring requirement for governmental burdening of religious
practice in the contexts of land use and institutionalized persons.220
Even beyond this heightened standard, Congress further extended
protection of religious freedom by defining “religious exercise” broadly
as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to,

215. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (discussing how application of RFRA to the states
represents a significant congressional intrusion into States’ authority and
discretion in regulating the health and welfare of their citizens); see also
Holt, 574 U.S. at 357 (“In making RFRA applicable to the States and their
subdivisions, Congress relied on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but in City of Boerne v. Flores this Court held that RFRA exceeded
Congress’ powers under that provision.” (citation omitted)).
216. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1 (1998); State Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts, Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures (May 4,
2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfrastatutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/59F4-MNC4].
217. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc to 2000cc–5), discussed in Holt, 574 U.S. at 356 (“Congress enacted
RLUIPA and its sister statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA), ‘in order to provide very broad protection for religious
liberty.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573
U.S. 682, 693 (2014))).
218. Holt, 574 U.S. at 357.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 357–58.

1083

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
Animal-Protection Efforts and the Free Exercise Clause

a system of religious belief.”221 Congress further mandated that this
concept of religious exercise be construed broadly and liberally in favor
of protecting religious exercise.222

V. Recent Developments in Free-Exercise
Jurisprudence
At the time that the Supreme Court decided Smith in 1990, the
decision was considered to have constructed “a new Free Exercise
Clause.”223 But the realm of free-exercise jurisprudence since that time
has been a complex web of back-and-forth, and Smith’s “new Free
Exercise Clause”224 would only crumble from that point forward. Smith
ultimately represents a contentious—yet remarkably persistent—case
in the overall span of free-exercise jurisprudence. In the decades that
followed Smith, numerous calls were made to override it, and Congress
and the Supreme Court engaged in a decade-long tug-of-war on religious
freedom,225 demonstrated through the passages of RFRA and RLUIPA.
On the judicial front, additional recent cases before the Supreme
Court have called into question the remaining applicability of Smith.
The new composition of the Court, unlike that present for Smith, has
demonstrated greater concordance with Congress in strengthening
protection of religious exercise.
In Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo,226 three decades after Smith,
the Court decided in favor of protection of religious exercise in the time
of COVID-19.227 The case involved challenges to New York executive
orders limiting attendance at religious services in geographic areas
designated as having higher COVID infection rates.228 The petitioners
claimed that the executive orders treated religious “houses of worship
much more harshly than comparable secular facilities,” thereby violating their Free Exercise rights.229 Per the executive order, a house of
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A).
222. Holt, 574 U.S. at 358 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(g)).
223. Gordon III, supra note 172, at 65.
224. Id. at 65–66.
225. See supra Part IV.
226. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam).
227. Id. at 69. This case was decided by a differently composed Court, after
Justice Amy Coney Barrett replaced the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg.
Josh Blackman, The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause, 44 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 637, 646 (2021). This development prompted a change in
course in the direction of free-exercise protection. Id. at 700.
228. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 65–66; see id. at 76
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing these hot spot zones as those in which
infection rates had spiked).
229. Id. at 66 (majority opinion).
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worship located within a “red zone” could admit no more than ten
persons, while businesses categorized as “essential” within the same
zone could admit an unlimited number of people.230 The Court determined that since these regulations were neither neutral nor of general
applicability, they had to survive strict scrutiny—that is, the regulations had to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest.231 In an astonishingly brief discussion, the Court determined
that the restrictions were not narrowly tailored because they were “far
more severe than ha[d] been shown to be required to prevent the spread
of the virus at the [houses of worship].”232 The brevity of the discussion
can be attributed at least in part to the fact that the decision was not
made on the merits, but rather was merely a request for a stay of the
district-court ruling pending appeal.233
Earlier that year, the Court had addressed similar free-exercise
cases complicated by COVID-19. In South Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom234 and Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak,235
the Court had determined that state officials could “restrict attendance
at houses of worship so long as comparable secular institutions face[d]
restrictions that are at least equally as strict” without running afoul of
the Constitution.236 Dissenting in Roman Catholic Diocese, Justice
Sotomayor asserted that such precedent should have controlled in
Roman Catholic Diocese, and wrote that she saw “no justification for

230. Id. at 65–66.
231. Id. at 67. The restrictions were not considered neutral by the Court because
they “single[d] out houses of worship for especially harsh treatment.” Id.
at 66. Interestingly, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, which the Court
cites in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn as support for its determination
that the restrictions there were not neutral, Hialeah’s ordinances failed
not because they singled out religious entities for worse treatment than
secular entities, but because they singled out a specific religious entity over
other religious entities. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993), cited in Roman Cath. Diocese of
Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 66; Blackman, supra note 227 at 655, 713, 718.
For example, recall that kosher slaughter was explicitly exempted from
the ordinance’s reach. See supra text accompanying note 192. It could be
argued, then, that strict scrutiny was not the standard to apply in Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn.
232. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67.
233. Id. at 65–66.
234. 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).
235. 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020).
236. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 79 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (citing S. Bay United Pentecostal v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613,
1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)).
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the Court’s change of heart.”237 From the point of Roman Catholic
Diocese forward, the Court and its new 5–4 split consistently ruled in
favor of protecting free exercise of religion.238
The following spring in Tandon v. Newsom,239 the Court continued
to stray from its still-recent decisions in South Bay Pentecostal Church
and Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley. The Court wrote that government
regulations “trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause,
whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more favorably
than religious exercise” and that it was irrelevant that a “State treats
some comparable secular businesses or other activities as poorly as or
even less favorably than the religious exercise at issue.”240 The issue in
Tandon, as the Court put it, was that “California treat[ed] some
comparable secular activities more favorably than at-home religious
exercise . . . .”241
In another fairly brief discussion, the Court asserted that
“California’s Blueprint System contains myriad exceptions and accommodations for comparable activities, thus requiring the application of
strict scrutiny.”242 Following that assertion, the Court made no analysis
of whether the state’s restrictions were narrowly tailored.243
Tandon employed a “most-favored” framework, echoing a principle
asserted by a dissenting judge on the Ninth Circuit’s panel below.244
That principle was that “regulations must place religious activities on
par with the most favored class of comparable secular activities, or face

237. Id. Although the Court never explicitly overruled the standards enunciated
in South Bay United Pentecostal Church and Calvary Chapel, the circuits
below understood that to have been the practical result of the Court’s
decision in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn. See Agudath Isr. of Am.
v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 635 n.20 (2nd Cir. 2020), quoted in Blackman,
supra note 227 at 728–29 (“[T]he Second Circuit . . . panel observed [that]
Roman Catholic Diocese ‘has supplanted’ the ‘Chief Justice’s concurring
opinion in South Bay.’”).
238. Blackman, supra note 227, at 638 (“The new Roberts Court would turn
the tide on COVID-19 cases in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo . . . . Over the course of five months, the Court consistently ruled
in favor of the free exercise of religion.”).
239. 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam).
240. Id. at 1296.
241. Id. at 1297.
242. Id. at 1298.
243. The Court cited Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye for this narrow tailoring
standard, but followed that citation with no analysis or application,
merely asserting that the standard “is not watered down” and it “really
means what it says.” Id. at 1298 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)).
244. Blackman, supra note 227, at 740–42.
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strict scrutiny.”245 Indeed, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit
had erred in denying relief from the state’s regulation246 and held that
“[i]f ‘any comparable secular activity’ is given some special status, then
the free exercise of religion must also be afforded that ‘most-favored’
status.”247
The Court decided Fulton v. City of Philadelphia248 just two months
after Tandon. Unlike the previous COVID cases addressed above,
Fulton received plenary consideration and full briefing and argument.249
The case involved Philadelphia’s refusal to refer children to Catholic
Social Services (CSS) upon discovering that CSS would not, per its
claimed religious beliefs about marriage, certify same-sex couples for
foster parentship.250 CSS filed suit, claiming this conduct by the city
violated its free-exercise rights.251 Both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected CSS’s free-exercise claim,
holding that the city’s non-discrimination requirements were neutral
and generally applicable under Smith.252 Upon seeking review by the
Supreme Court, CSS urged the Court to overrule Smith.253
While five justices criticized Smith, the Court did not ultimately
accede to petitioners’ request to overrule Smith, claiming instead that
the case fell outside the scope of Smith because the city’s policies were
not truly neutral and generally applicable.254 The Court asserted that a
government did not act neutrally, and therefore fell outside Smith’s
more lenient scope, when it “proceeds in a manner intolerant of religious
245. Tandon v. Newsom, 992 F.3d 916, 932 (9th Cir. 2021) (Bumatay, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (emphasis added) (citing Roman
Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66–67 (2020)), quoted
in Blackman, supra note 227, at 742.
246. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296 (“The Ninth Circuit’s failure to grant an
injunction pending appeal was erroneous.”), discussed in Blackman, supra
note 227, at 744.
247. Blackman, supra note 227, at 745 (first quoting Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at
1296; and then quoting Tandon, 992 F.3d at 932 (Bumatay, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part)).
248. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
249. Blackman, supra note 227, at 742–44; Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, Proceedings and Orders, SCOTUSblog, https://www.
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-pennsylvania/
[https://perma.cc/PFG5-S6NA] (last visited Mar. 5, 2022) (showing
briefing by the parties and amici from August 2019 to September 2020, with
oral arguments in November 2020).
250. Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1874 (2021).
251. Id. at 1876.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1876–77.

1087

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
Animal-Protection Efforts and the Free Exercise Clause

beliefs or restricts practices because of their religious nature.”255 Further, “[a] law is not generally applicable if it ‘invite[s]’ the government
to consider the particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing
‘a mechanism for individualized exemptions.’”256
As outside the scope of Smith, the Court evaluated the government
policy under strict scrutiny, writing that “so long as the government
can achieve its interests in a manner that does not burden religion, it
must do so.”257 In determining whether the government’s actions were
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, the Court clarified
that the question was “not whether the City has a compelling interest
in enforcing its non-discrimination policies generally, but whether it has
such an interest in denying an exception to CSS.”258 The Court
determined that the city’s asserted interests in maximizing the number
of foster parents and ensuring equal treatment of prospective foster
parents and children were insufficient in that narrowed context.259 “If
anything,” the Court wrote, “including CSS in the program seems likely
to increase, not reduce, the number of available foster parents.”260
Although declining to overrule Smith in Fulton, individual
justices—over three decades after Smith and its enunciation of a lenient
free-exercise-burdening standard—did not decline the opportunity to
criticize Smith through several concurrences. Justice Barrett, concurring, wrote that “it is difficult to see why the Free Exercise Clause”
would offer only protection from discrimination and not active accommodation.261 Notably, Justice Alito even highlighted slaughter regulations as what he considered a potential “startling consequence[]” of
Smith.262 “[S]uppose that a State, following the example of several
European countries, made it unlawful to slaughter an animal that had
not first been rendered unconscious. That law would be fine under
Smith even though it would outlaw kosher and halal slaughter.”263

255. Id. at 1877.
256. Id. (quoting Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)). The relevant
context from Smith held that “where the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases
of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 884
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)).
257. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1881.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1881–82.
260. Id. at 1882.
261. Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 1883–84 (Alito, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 1884 (footnote omitted).
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VI. New Free-Exercise Jurisprudence’s Influence on
Animal-Protection Legislative Efforts
What influence, if any, do these more recent developments in freeexercise jurisprudence have on animal-protection legislative efforts in
the specific context of religious use of animals and animal products?
How does this recent progression in free-exercise jurisprudence from the
time of COVID-19 forward bode for the ability of animal-protection
legislation to effectively protect animals in both secular and religious
contexts? To put it simply, it does not bode well. From Roman Catholic
Diocese forward, the Court has shifted towards prioritizing protection
of religious exercise over competing interests.264 There is little reason to
think that the interest in protecting sentient, non-human creatures
would supersede the interest in protection of religious practice.
It is unclear how the COVID-19 free-exercise cases and their
enunciated standards will apply in other contexts. It is clear that the
general attitude of the majority of today’s Court towards liberalization
of free-religious exercise does not lend itself to protection of animal welfare in the religious-exploitation context. But the standards enunciated
in the free-exercise COVID cases arguably do not necessarily pose a
prohibitive issue to broadening protection of animals to the religiousexercise context.
The Court concluded in Tandon that if any comparable secular
activity is given some special status, then the religious practice must
also be given special status.265 But what “special status” is provided to
secular restrictions on the exploitation of animals? It is religious use of
animals that is given explicit special status—through codified exemptions—in animal-protection legislation. Were those exemptions removed, and both secular and religious uses of animals treated the same,
the situation would not offend Tandon and would not trigger strict
scrutiny. However, the statement that “[i]t is no answer that a State
treats some comparable secular . . . . activities as poorly as or even less
favorably than the religious exercise at issue” may be problematic.266
For example, is restricting religious slaughter of animals to the same
degree as secular slaughter of animals “treat[ing] . . . comparable
secular . . . activities as poorly as . . . . the religious exercise[?]”
In Fulton, the Court asserted that “[g]overnment fails to act neutrally when it proceeds in a manner intolerant of religious beliefs or
restricts practices because of their religious nature.”267 The second half
of that quote, referencing restriction of a practice due to its religious
nature, can be understood through both Smith and Lukumi, recalling
264. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 244–47 and accompanying text.
266. See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
267. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877 (emphasis added).
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from Lukumi that the ordinance was not truly of general applicability
because it was enacted due to hostility against Santería.268 The first half
of the quote is somewhat more difficult to reconcile—that to be merely
“intolerant” of religion is a failure to act neutrally and therefore
warrants strict scrutiny.269 Does “intolerant” simply mean a refusal to
prevent discrimination against religious practice? Or does it extend to
a refusal to provide special accommodation for religious practice? If
refusing to afford accommodation for religious practices (the secular
counterpart of which receives no such accommodation) is “intolerant,”
then Smith, after Fulton, would be essentially null.
It is debatable whether extending restrictions on use of animals to
cover not only secular instances, but also religious such instances, would
therefore constitute “proceed[ing] in a manner intolerant of religious
beliefs,” although today’s Court would likely find such conduct intolerant of religion. But this Comment argues such restriction would clearly
not be “because of their religious nature.” It would be motivated by the
same reasoning that motivates secular restrictions on animal use: the
protection of animal welfare.

Conclusion
Animals across the United States are used and mistreated in religious practices that exist farther beyond the eyes of the law than secular
uses of animals. This is a topic meriting unique attention because,
unlike many other religious practices, each instance here involves the
ending of a life—or at the very least, the degradation of a life.270
Religiously slaughtered animals are regularly killed without the preslaughter stunning that is mandated by federal law to occur to the same
species in secular slaughterhouses. As a result, these animals live the
last moments (or sometimes, minutes) of their lives feeling the full pain
of having their throats slit. Fur-bearing animals are slaughtered and
skinned for their precious pelts, to be used in expensive religious headwear. Most of these fur-bearing animals, prior to meeting this fate,
spend the entirety of their lives confined to small cages, unable to live
by their natural instincts. Animals are also sacrificed in religious ceremonies and rituals, the specifics of which are somewhat uncertain due
to the clandestine nature of these practices. Various species of snakes
are held captive in unsuitable conditions, all to be held in the air and
draped around a practitioner’s arms in a risky demonstration of faith.
All of these practices, due to their religious nature, are subject to far
268. See supra notes 189–92 and accompanying text.
269. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877.
270. See Boradiansky, supra note 56, at 753 (“Taking the life of another living
creature is unique among religious practices. Unlike most religious rituals,
it necessarily involves extinguishing another life to further one’s own spiritual
growth.”).
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less legal scrutiny than secular practices involving animals. They exist
farther beyond the reach of the government, at least compared to the
scrutiny exercised over secular practices involving animals. As a result,
the animals involved in religious practices exist largely at the mercy of
the practitioners, utterly vulnerable to the dogma imposed on them by
those practitioners.
Smith’s free-exercise standard, enabling governments to burden religious practice through neutral and generally applicable laws supported
only by a legitimate governmental interest, was and remains today,
undoubtedly contested by huge segments of the American population,
as well as by a majority of today’s Court.271 But Smith was also undoubtedly a more favorable standard for imposing animal-protection
legislation on religious exploitation of animals than the United States
has seen before. Its standard enabled animal-protection laws, such as
animal-cruelty laws and regulation of slaughter, to impose the same
general and neutral level of protection for animals regardless of whether
those animals were to be exploited for religious or secular purposes. As
long as such animal-protection laws were not facades for religious
persecution, and not motivated in actuality by animosity towards
religious practices and applied for such end, Smith would not require
those laws to include any sort of religious- or spiritual-practice
exemption. This Comment argues that this broad opportunity for
animal-welfare protection is normatively highly desirable.
But the passages of RFRA and RLUIPA, changes in composition
of the Court, and subsequent shifts in free-exercise jurisprudence from
the start of COVID-19 and onward have starkly changed legislatures’
ability to burden religious practice not only in the name of animal
welfare, but in the name of countless competing interests. Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence is shifting to a more aggressive, pro-accommodation stance. It may no longer be enough, to avoid running afoul of the
First Amendment, to merely refrain from discriminating against
religious practice by imposing standards generally applicable to both
secular and religious activity. As a result, countless competing interests
may be subjugated, including the interest in protecting the sentient
lives of countless animals who receive little to no federal protection due
solely to their being used in a religious context.
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